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Australian foreign policy and news media: National identity and the sale 




This article explores the utility of a constructivist-media communications approach to 
understanding the production of national identity in Australia through a case study of 
the Australian Labor Party’s 2011 decision to allow uranium sales to India. The 
decision came at a time when Australian foreign policy, political debate and news 
media discourse were increasingly concerned with  India and China, as ‘rising’ 
superpowers whose prominence offered opportunities for economic prosperity even as 
it undermined settled regional power balances. This article finds that, rather than a 
matter of rational strategy, the decision was made in a context of considerable anxiety 
about the ‘Asian century’ as the Australian public, politicians and policymakers 
struggled to comprehend geopolitical change. It further argues that the constructivist 
project in international relations (IR) can benefit from engaging with insights from 
media and communications methodologies and by taking a less hierarchical approach 
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Constructivist scholars of IR have recently begun to reconsider the role the media plays in 
shaping identity and foreign policy and international politics.1 Within this scholarship, little has 
been written on the Australian context. In this article, we consider the position of the news media as 
mediators of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ discourse in Australia. We argue for an approach that sees both 
as powerful (although not always equally so) and mutually constituted elements of a dynamic, 
complex communications environment. We illustrate this approach through a case study of 
Australian print media coverage of the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) November 2011 decision to 
allow uranium sales to India, taken at its triennial National Conference. The conference has 
traditionally operated as a space in which the Labor Party’s policy positions, priorities, and values 
are debated. It is regularly attended by Labor party politicians, members and supporters as well as 
representatives from business and union groups, and attracts considerable media coverage. We are 
not concerned with the strategic value of the decision to sell uranium to India per se, but focus on 
the ideational and discursive space that facilitated the decision and the media’s role in constructing 
a cohesive account of Australia’s foreign policy. Multiple, competing and overlapping ‘identity’ 
narratives can be identified in Australian political history. These narratives have defined the nation 
as multicultural, English-speaking, Asian, democratic, traditional, conservative, neoliberal, socialist, 
rationalist, moral, colonial, postcolonial, and a ‘creative’ middle power. Policy options are therefore 
shaped by the conceptions emphasised in the public, political and media discourse at a particular 
time.  This paper undertakes a media discourse analysis, revealing that the decision to sell uranium 
to India was taken in an ideational context of anxiety about the ‘rise’ of Asia’s ‘giants’ China and 
India. As a secondary concern, we argue that theoretical engagement between social constructivism 
and media and communications can assist our understanding of identity construction and foreign 
policy.  
 
                                                 
1 For various examples, see: Turner 2014, Seethaler et. al. 2013, Pan 2012, Jackson 2005, Miskimmon et. al 2013. 
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Constructivism, Identity and Media Discourse 
Much constructivist IR (with the exception of social constructivism) has neglected non-elite 
discourse.2 Its most common form, ‘Wendtian’ constructivism has followed neorealist and 
neoliberal scholarship in seeing IR as having fixed units of influence and limited, elite-centred 
human agency. This focus on policy elites is also reflected in critical constructivist scholarship 
(despite its critique of Wendt’s state-centred vision of identity politics). This is perplexing, because 
a less hierarchical account of the formation of identity, which places ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ opinion 
in the same ideational space with identities flowing ‘up’ and ‘down’ between ‘them (Mandaville 
2002), is an established position in a range of disciplines that constructivists draw on for theoretical 
insights (such as anthropology, sociology and cultural studies). Social constructivists, led by Ted 
Hopf (2002), have sought remedy this omission by engaging with popular discourse and 
undertaking some limited analysis of media sources. We seek to extend this here, intervening by 
suggesting that constructivism can benefit from media and communications approaches to the study 
of foreign policy and identity.   
.  
Though virtually all IR scholarship engages with media coverage or institutions in some 
capacity, the role that the media play in constructing state identity has only recently been 
scrutinised. Furthermore, Alister Miskimmon and colleagues (2013) have recently argued that 
communications as a discipline can make important contributions to IR. Following their work, and 
that of social constructivists, we argue that the media interprets foreign policy choices outside of 
interpreting external strategic narratives. In our case study, media narratives of Australia’s place in 
the world are drawn from the same identity discourses that inform broader public and political 
debate. Therefore, we need to consider the media’s interpretation of both Australia’s place in the 
world and its narration of other international agents. 
 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Wendt 1992. For a critique, see Ruggie 1998. For further discussions of constructivism, see Doty 
1993; Reus-Smit 1997. 
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Foreign policy has also been considered as part of media and communications research, 
although the two have rarely been linked. Studies have analysed the relationship between foreign 
policy, news coverage and public opinion; sought to uncover the ways that news media represents 
links between foreign policy and national interest and evaluates the role played by national identity 
(e.g. Nossek 2004); analysed news and influence on domestic and foreign policy agendas;3 
considered the impact of external events on coverage of foreign policy (e.g. Goodman 1999; Hou 
and Ma 2009; Lu 2011; Peng 2004); and questioned the influence of the news media on broader 
public perceptions of international allegiances and tensions (e.g. Goldsmith and Horibuchi 2010). In 
an analysis of the media’s ability to influence both the public and policymakers, Zhang (2010: 237) 
argues ‘there is much scope for the news media to play a role in the policymaking process’. More 
recently, researchers have considered the impact of new technologies and formats on these media-
foreign policy relationships, notably considering the role of ‘soft news’ (Baum 2003) and 
reconceptualising the media’s foreign policy agenda-setting power as the ‘al Jazeera effect’ 
(replacing the ‘CNN effect’) (Seib 2008). 
 
Douglas Van Belle (2012: 286) has highlighted resonances between media and IR, 
identifying key research strands such as bureaucratic responsiveness to the media, agenda-setting, 
indexing, public opinion, and the role of changing technologies. Despite this, he correctly notes a 
lack of engagement between media and communications and constructivist IR: ‘(news) framing and 
constructivism appear to be estranged’. Although constructivism has generally been concerned with 
media texts, it has not invested in insights from media and communications theories and 
approaches. More importantly for this study, however, no attempt has been made to examine the 
connections between media and foreign policy discourse in the Australian context. We identify two 
key flaws in constructivist approaches to the media: the first is methodological, as constructivists 
have not drawn on media and communications approaches; for example, when defining samples for 
                                                 
3 Po-Lin Pan (2008: 31) traces this agenda-setting research from Bernard Cohen’s 1963 The Press and Foreign Policy 
to Maxwell McCombs’ 2004 Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion. See also McCombs and Shaw’s 
seminal 1972 study. 
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analysis (Vucetic 2006; Hopf 2002). The second is the frequent emphasis on a hierarchical  
elite/non-elite dichotomy in constructivist approaches, and is of more relevance to the analysis 
undertaken here. 
  
This hierarchy of discourse can be seen in an emerging strand of constructivist work dealing 
with the media in new ways (Turner 2014; Seethaler et. al. 2013; Pan 2012; Jackson 2005; 
Campbell 1998). In an excellent analysis Chengxin Pan (2012: 24-25) examines the ways in which 
discourse on China reflects US identity, suggesting that while the mass media may be ‘the most 
visible outlets’ of the China threat thesis it is more important to examine it in ‘the more analytical 
and intellectual domain of China watching in IR’. Oliver Turner (2014: 9) explicitly avoids such a 
hierarchy. A more explicit example of this discursive hierarchy can be seen in Richard Jackson’s 
(2005: 17) theorisation of language in constructing the war on terror. Jackson locates government-
generated content (‘official speeches, media interviews, press releases, radio and television 
addresses and articles written by leading figures in the administration’) as the most important 
discourse. His second and third levels of discourse comprise further government documents 
(Jackson 2005: 17). Outside this hierarchy, discourses ‘have to be mediated and retransmitted by 
other social actors; the media’ (Jackson 2005: 20). This visualisation operates akin to a caste system 
in which media commentators lie outside the hierarchy, and indeed have proven ‘untouchable’ for 
many IR researchers.  
 
In what Simon Cottle (2009: 17) has described as ‘today’s complex journalism ecology’, the 
‘enhanced connectivity, interactivity and invigoration’ of new spaces for citizen journalism and 
alternative perspectives calls for a reconfiguring of the relationship between elite/non-elite 
discourses, which we argue is not (and has never been) a simple dichotomy. Elite and non-elite 
discourses operate in the same ideational space, reflecting and shaping each other in different ways 
at different times, with definitional power flowing between the two. In this space ‘established and 
6 
 
dominant centres of journalism’ retain elements of their ‘capacity to authorise who enters the news 
domain, and how, and when’ (Cottle 2009: 17). Furthermore, if constructivists are to assume that 
the international structure and its actors are ‘mutually constituted’, it follows that state-level 
structures and their agents (those not engaged in active decision-making) are likewise mutually 
constituted. On this basis, we contend that the news media provides a crucial public space in which 
identity discourses are constructed and circulated, and plays a key role in explaining and engaging 
with international affairs in a way that makes sense of foreign policy for citizens and localises 
international politics.4 
 
Narratives of Australian Identity and Foreign Policy 
 Coverage of the ALP’s November 2011 decision to allow the sale of uranium to India 
worked in the sample as a mechanism through which particular constructions of Australian national 
identity were developed. Two broad narratives of Australian identity and foreign policy emerge. 
The first, which we identify as ‘traditionalist’, sees Australia’s security as dependent on strategic 
alliances with the UK and US. This ‘great and powerful friends’ narrative (see Menzies 1958; 
Howard 2011 for political examples) relies on longstanding conceptions of Australia as a rationalist 
actor seeking security in a dangerous and unfamiliar region.5 India has been seen in an increasingly 
positive light within this narrative, through an emphasis on colonial legacies as causes for deeper 
engagement (Davis 2014). The second narrative, more prominent here, sees Australia as a ‘creative 
middle power’, and emphasises Australia’s active role within Asia. This narrative emphasises 
Australia’s ‘unique’ place in the world, due to its ‘European’ heritage and ‘Asian’ geography, its 
special moral responsibilities and ability to ‘punch above its weight’ in world affairs (see Rudd, 
2007; Turnbull, 2015 for political examples).6 These Australian identity stories are deployed in 
diffuse manners: India’s refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and pursuit of 
                                                 
4 Media and communications scholarship has considered foreign policy: see Robinson 2001 and Nacos et al 2000. 
5 For a history of these narratives, see Walker 2002. 
6 For an analysis of representations of ‘Asia’ in Australian political narratives, see Brookes 2012. 
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nuclear weapons runs counter to the multilateral streak in the ‘creative middle power’ narrative, yet 
selling uranium to assist a neighbour rising out of poverty appeals to this same narrative. They do 
not conform to partisan political divides and are not mutually exclusive, overlapping in creative, 
dynamic ways in political and media discourse. 
 
We are influenced also by critical constructivist approaches to discourse analysis, which 
treat foreign policy as a space in which the nation’s existence and purpose is narrated to its citizens; 
noting, however, that such analyses have tended to focus on elite discourse. We follow David 
Campbell’s (1992: 4) analytical method, examining the political causes and consequences of 
emphasising ‘one mode of representation over another’ when defining international relationships. 
Within this approach, we emphasise the role of the media in ‘narrating the nation’ (Bhabha 1990), 
providing a space in which national identity discourses are constructed, contested, and 
disseminated. This is always achieved with an awareness of the ‘Others’ who lie beyond ‘our’ 
borders, and we are further influenced by Edward Said’s (1978) approach in Orientalism. In 
Australia’s case this manifests, as David Walker (2010: 46) has highlighted, with ‘demotic or 
popular’ narrations of ‘Asia’.7   
 
Research Design 
In order to explore representations of ‘our’ nation and the ‘others’ beyond its borders, this 
article undertakes a qualitative analysis of news discourse, drawing on the results of a brief content 
analysis to guide a more detailed discourse analysis. This approach allows a systematic mapping of 
news frames, genres and themes to inform exploration of the narratives of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
mobilised in newspaper coverage of the ALP’s 2011 decision to end the ban on uranium sales to 
India (Georgakopolou and Goutsos 2004: 185). In the tradition of scholars like Teun van Dijk 
(1991; 1993) and Norman Fairclough (1995), this analysis works from the starting point that 
                                                 
7 See also Aly and Walker 2007; D’Cruz and Steele 2003. 
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discourses are historically produced and understood, and that ‘the ideologies of powerful groups’ 
work through discourse to legitimate power structures (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 3).  
 
The sample is drawn from 19 daily and weekend newspapers, chosen to cover all Australian 
state capitals and the national capital, national and metropolitan newspapers, major newspaper 
owners, and both tabloid and broadsheet formats (see Figure One). The sample was compiled 
through a search in both Factiva and Lexis-Nexis for 2 – 8 December 2011, ensuring that it includes 
each day of the week.8 The initial search for the terms ‘uranium’ and ‘India’ in the headline, full 
article or both, yielded a sample of 151 articles. The unit of analysis was a single article and each 
was coded for a range of identifying criteria, including publication date, author, article type. 
Articles not related to the decision to overturn the ban on uranium sales, and those not coded as 
‘news’ or ‘opinion’, were excluded. This left 132 relevant articles, which were then coded for 
dominant news frames (domestic, international or financial news) and their position on the decision. 
Finally, the sample was coded for relevant mentions of China, yielding a sub-sample of 33 articles 
that were the focus of discursive analysis. Here, 27 letters to the editor from within the broader 
sample were also considered, 7 of which mention China. This allowed moving beyond the ‘elite’ 
and ‘non-elite’ dichotomy to consider news media discourse as a space for the negotiation and 
renegotiation of identities.  
 
Results  
National newspaper The Australian (and Weekend Australian) ran the most stories covering 
the decision (25), while the Hobart Mercury (and Sunday Tasmanian) ran only two. When reporting 
the ALP’s decision, 25 per cent of articles in the broader sample mentioned China (see Figure 
One).9 News articles dominated the broader sample (67.5 per cent), with opinion pieces (25.4 per 
cent) and editorials (7.1 per cent) making up the remainder. However, mentions of China were more 
                                                 
8 Best practice in content analysis of daily newspapers as it accounts for the cyclical nature of coverage Riffe et al 1993. 
9 Similarly, 26 per cent of letters contain relevant mentions China.  
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frequent in these opinion and editorial pieces than in news items, and as a result the sub-sample 
features a more even distribution (46.9 per cent news, 37.5 per cent opinion and 15.6 per cent 
editorial). The tone of articles was overwhelmingly neutral (77.8 per cent). However, in the sub-
sample, the same percentage of articles was ‘positive’ (in support of the decision) as ‘neutral’ (43.8 
per cent), suggesting that when considered in an international context, articles were far more likely 
to take a position. Even ‘neutral’ articles tended to fill the issue with ideational meaning through the 
selection of quotations and evidence. A smaller percentage of ‘negative’ articles critiqued the 
ALP’s decision in both the broader and sub-sample (4.8 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively).  
   
This story was most commonly framed as domestic news, suggesting that this foreign policy 
choice was localised for readers, with 66 per cent of articles in the sample focusing on the political 
meanings of the ALP’s policy debates and decisions at their National Conference. In contrast, 
stories that linked the decision to China were more likely to be framed as international, with 72 per 
cent considering the decision in terms of Australian foreign policy. Significantly, 74.2 per cent of 
stories framed as international politics linked the decision to China (see Figure Two). A smaller 
portion of the sample (9.5 per cent) framed the decision as finance/economic news, reporting on the 
impact of the decision on the Australian mining industry and share prices.  
 
‘In Between the Giants’: Constructions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
Our platform enables us to sell uranium to China, but not to India. Now, this is not an 
intellectually defensible proposition (Gillard in Asia-Pacific Focus 2012). 
 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s widely reported argument at the ALP’s 2011 National Conference, in 
support of her proposal that Australia overturn the ban on uranium sales to India, was simple and 
concise. An open construction, it left space for media coverage and expert commentary to fill in the 
blanks, drawing on longheld public beliefs and assumptions to imbue the argument with a range of 
meanings and preconceptions. For example, the Prime Minister’s explanation hinted at rationality, 
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which a The West Australian (2011: 20) editorial paraphrased to remind its readers that it was not 
‘rational’ to export to China but not India, ‘the world’s biggest democracy’. National Secretary of 
the Australian Workers Union, Paul Howes (2011: 90), went further, mistakenly describing China 
as the ‘world’s largest military dictatorship’ when supporting overturning the ban (which we will 
discuss below). Gillard’s description took on different meanings when interpreted through a range 
of media narratives, revealing the process of identity construction at play in media coverage of 
international affairs. 
 
News media constructions of China and India worked in the sample as a mechanism through 
and against which narratives of Australian identity were constructed, contested and circulated. Both 
news and opinion/editorial narratives situated the decision in a framework where Australian identity 
formation was achieved through engagement with its neighbours, allies and rivals. This analysis 
follows Campbell (1992: 4) in examining the attempt to ‘[render] the unfamiliar in the terms of the 
familiar’ as a state grapples with ‘rise’ of Others in the international system. Campbell’s words are 
useful in considering why this was reported primarily as a local political story. Here, dual narratives 
of Australian identity on the world stage were developed through constructions of India and China 
who appear throughout the coverage as ‘giants’ (Fleming 2011: 61) whose actions and reactions 
Australia must manage. 
 
A ‘Victory for Common Sense’: Rationality, Morality and Australia’s ‘Unique Responsibility’ 
The dual construction of Australian identity as rational and moral was most prominent in 
opinion and editorial pieces in the sub-sample and echoed in letters to the editor. It was used to 
justify Australia’s decision-making processes taking both its domestic politics and broader 
international responsibilities into consideration.10 Here, longstanding Australian insecurities about 
the nation’s ability to influence world affairs and its international reputation come into play. 
                                                 
10 This dual construction of Australia as simultaneously ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ also plays out in the larger sample. 
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Discussions of ‘rationality’ in the sample were consistently expressed through appeals to ‘common 
sense’, presenting Australia’s previous refusal to sell uranium to India as an ‘anomaly’ that needed 
correction (Sydney Morning Herald 2011: 10).11 For example, in the Sunday Telegraph, Paul 
Howes (2011: 90) argued there was no ‘rational or acceptable reason’ not to sell uranium to India. 
He based this on the fact that ‘Australia currently exports uranium to China, the world’s largest 
military dictatorship – but will not export it to India, the world’s largest democracy.’ Similarly, a 
letter to the Canberra Times described China as a ‘police state’ in contrast to India’s democracy 
(Gordon 2011: 22). This relies on an evocative but misleading representation of China’s political 
system, because China is not a military dictatorship or a police state, but a one-party state or 
‘communist party-state’ (Joseph 2014: 13-4). In this manner, Howes invites the audience to place 
China alongside the most dangerous of ‘rogue states’: ‘axis of evil’ countries like Iran and North 
Korea, who might commonly be referred to in such terms. A similar theme is evident in then-ALP 
Senator David Feeney’s approach to India, which Howes quotes to make his counter-argument. 
Feeney (in Howes 2011: 90) addressed the Conference in sensationalist terms, arguing: ‘if you’re 
going to export uranium to India, you may as well start exporting it to Iran while you’re at it’. 
Further to these rationalist narratives, Howes (2011: 90) argues that this decision ‘is also about 
maturity… Australian Labor must show it is mature enough to deal with hard issues, and to reject 
misplaced ideology’. This mixture of rational self-interest and morality is mobilised to argue for 
change, and while intellectually inconsistent, provides a clear insight into the complex narratives of 
Australian identity in the sample.  
 
The modernist IR theory of realism has coloured media discourse in Australia that seeks to 
paint decisions as ‘rational’. In the sample, the notion that China and India are ‘the same’ leads to 
the ‘rational’ assumption that we should sell uranium to both or neither. In these terms, however, 
Australian policy is evidently ‘irrational’, as it has taken an inconsistent position. Presenting 
                                                 
11 In the larger sample, Tony Abbott is quoted describing the decision as ‘un-stuffing a stuff-up’ (Nicholson 2011: 4). 
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Australia as having a rationalist foreign policy, media coverage constructed a rational, enlightened 
Australian self. However, these were accompanied by an always-present discourse that represented 
the nation as ‘moral’, relying on factors beyond the purely rational in its foreign policy decision-
making. Here, while Australia is obliged to make rational choices, it also has a ‘unique’ moral 
obligation to control which other nations can have access to uranium, according to a set of criteria 
that are not (and cannot be) purely rational. 
 
Discursive constructions of Australia as moral were variously expressed throughout the 
sample as a mechanism both to support and attack the ALP’s decision. For example, the ALP’s 
Peter Garrett (2011: 21; see also Sweeney 2011: 22) argued in the Sunday Age that Australia has a 
moral obligation not to sell uranium to India due to its ‘unique and central role in international 
efforts to advance nuclear disarmament’ afforded by its vast uranium reserves. Howes (2011: 90), 
however, presents Australia’s true moral obligation as being to support India’s ‘clean’ development, 
because India has ‘millions of people who have a right to safe, cheap and clean power’. Australia, 
here, would be supporting India’s development of clean energy and contributing to global efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions.12 In addition, in helping to ‘lift hundreds of millions from poverty’, 
Australia is able to seize ‘an undeniable economic opportunity’ while simultaneously responding to 
the ‘profound moral dimension’ of its decision to sell uranium to India (Advertiser 2011: 16). From 
the opposite perspective, ‘Friends of the Earth’ lobbyist Jim Green (2011: 10) argued in a letter to 
The Age that selling uranium to a country in a ‘nuclear arms race’ with Pakistan, ‘with no 
meaningful commitment… to curb its weapons program’ would be ‘spineless, irresponsible, 
dangerous sycophancy’ on Australia’s part.13  
 
                                                 
12 Then-Federal Resources Minister Martin Ferguson made this argument, which was quoted throughout the sample: see 
West Australian 2011: 20. 




A key part of this moral consideration is the issue of whether ‘we’ can ‘trust’ India with 
‘our’ uranium: the uranium that Australia remains morally responsible for even after it is mined and 
sold. In one letter to the Hobart Mercury this responsibility meant that Australia, ‘as one of the 
most geological[ly] stable land masses in the world’, should seek to store the nuclear materials after 
they had been used (Port 2011: 22). Arguments evaluating India’s trustworthiness in the sample 
highlighted its status as a ‘responsible’ (Australian 2011: 13) nation with a ‘perfect non-
proliferation record’ (constructed in contrast to China’s record) (Lee 2011: 12). This overplays 
Australia’s role because India already has multiple sources of uranium and already has an extensive 
nuclear arsenal (Ganguly, 2008). More deeply, however, arguments that we can ‘trust’ India are 
based on a narrative suggesting not only that they have a record of ‘responsible behaviour’ but also 
that they are ‘a democracy, just like us’ (Howes 2011: 90): ‘the world’s largest democracy’ (Gillard 
in Kenny 2011: 4), an ‘English-speaking’, ‘cricket mad’ nation with whom we have ‘strong 
common interests’ (Fleming 2011: 61). Here, India shares many characteristics with our ‘great and 
powerful friends’; its development offers Australia an opportunity to deepen ties to this trustworthy 
superpower. In contrast, the argument against trusting India with our uranium relies on a discourse 
in both opinion columns and letters to the editor that constructs India as irrational, stubborn, 
‘warlike’, unstable and (therefore) threatening (see, for example, Hanson 2011: 13; Butfoy 2011: 8; 
Gordon 2011: 22; Shepherd 2011: 22). Selling uranium to ‘them’ would therefore reflect poorly on 
our own moral standing. Both supporters and opponents of the sale of uranium to India invoke 
morality and rationality as universalising meta-discourses, while grounding their recommendations 
in different perceptions of India’s needs and intentions. These competing perceptions of India are 
manifestations of a deeper discourse reflecting Australia’s longstanding ambivalence about its place 
in, and engagement with, the broader Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Discourses of Danger: Asia as a threatening region 
14 
 
Australian public and political discourse has long been a space in which anxieties about the 
nation’s geographic location in a potentially threatening region have been expressed (Walker 1999; 
White 1997; White 1981). This has been the case since Australia’s inception as a British colony, to 
the ‘White Australia’ policy, and, as Anthony Burke (2008) has argued, to its contemporary asylum 
seeker policies. In this context, anxiety about Australia’s geopolitical situation pervades the sample, 
manifesting in a discourse where potential risk is managed by ensuring that its neighbours ‘play by 
the rules… in an increasingly volatile world’ (Arnold 2011: 74). These ‘rules’ are the attitudes and 
behaviours expected of a democratic nation on the international stage; the same rules that are 
implicitly followed by ‘us’ and our allies. One strand of discourse emphasises that ‘strong 
safeguards’ will be put in place to ensure Australian uranium is not put to any ‘improper’ use in 
India (Sunday Telegraph 2011: 7); and significantly, it is argued that these must not be ‘weaker’ 
than those Australia has in place in agreements with China and Russia (Medcalf 2011: 15). This 
conceptual linking of China and Russia is also evident in the recurring argument that sales to India 
are justified because Australia already sells uranium to ‘countries like China and Russia’ (Steketee 
2011: 26; Forde 2011: 12). This forms part of a discourse in both news and letters to the editor 
where China is one of a series of large, unpredictable (and here, Communist or post-Communist) 
nations that pose a potential threat to Australia due to their ‘aggressive’ expansionist policies 
(Gordon 2011: 22). This ties into the traditionalist narrative in which Australia unquestioningly sells 
uranium to the US and the UK, but will not trust other major powers of differing cultural 
backgrounds. More broadly, the discursive construction of India, China and Russia as requiring 
careful management stands in stark contrast to a silence in these news narratives around safeguards 
in sales to the US, France, Japan, Canada and the UK (Department of Resources, Energy and 
Tourism 2012). 
 
 While India is positioned in these parts of the sample as worthy of the same treatment as 
China and Russia, its position as an ‘illegitimate nuclear weapons state’ within the NPT deepens 
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feelings of anxiety about safeguards. In addition, there is a clear concern about Australia’s ability to 
enact its ‘creative middle power’ role to manage the relationship and hold India to account in light 
of the US’ failure to do so. As Marianne Hanson (2011: 13; see also Hudson 2011: 11) writes in The 
Canberra Times:  
If the US was unable to extract real concessions from [their] deal, what makes 
Julia Gillard think that India will accept or comply with the ‘strict’ conditions on 
uranium sales asked for by Australia? 
 
This concern about Australia’s ability to manage its relationship with an increasingly powerful 
India, described as ‘rising’ (e.g. Medcalf 2011: 15) in the same way that Australia imagines a 
‘rising’ China’, also manifests in the repeated emphasis on its physical characteristics and 
population. China and India emerge as economic and strategic ‘rivals’, seeking to maximise their 
own development while also earning recognition as ‘major power[s] with increasingly global 
interests’ (Defence White Paper in Ellery 2011: 6). The positioning of China and India as 
competing is also used to represent these states as potentially aggressive. A key element, here, is the 
construction of India’s large, and growing, population as ‘balancing out’ China’s, in the hope this 
will neutralise any potential threat: 
Analysts say the US sees friendly ties with a democratic and increasingly 
militarised country of 1.21 billion people as a potentially powerful deterrent to any 
plans China might have to throw its weight around (Fleming 2011: 61). 
 
India’s militarisation and population size is seen as a plus for the US and, by proxy, Australia, 
allowing India to serve as a potential ally and ‘democratic counter-weight’ (e.g. Murphy 2011: 1; 
Steketee 2011: 26) to China (positioned as the true threat and implicitly not democratic when 
compared to India). Trust in democracy and liberalism are central to Australia’s identity narrative as 
a liberal, rationalist state operating in a world in which it can only trust other liberal democracies. 
While India’s size and militarisation are constructed as positive in these articles, a second strand of 
discourse positions these same characteristics as representing a potential geopolitical risk for 
Australia. This is seen in expressions of angst over the perception that India is engaged in a 
perpetual war with Pakistan and has a history of border conflicts and communal violence. Here, 
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India’s rise is presented as a potential threat in itself and, in Katherine Fleming’s (2011: 61) piece in 
the West Australian, secretive, masked by the simultaneous rise of China: ‘while the world has been 
focused on the astronomic growth of China, India has been amassing money, power and influence’. 
Here, the implication is that India has been surreptitiously strengthening while the world’s attention 
has been on China, which reflects Australia’s preoccupation with the ‘rise of China’. This strand of 
discourse implies lingering (post)colonial fears over India’s intentions and credibility as a 
trustworthy, liberal-democratic ‘Anglosphere’ state (Davis 2014).  
 
‘Charming’ her with Yellowcake: (Ir)rationality, Orientalism, and Gender  
The flip side of seeing Australia as rational and/or moral in the sample is the representation 
of Others. India and China appear throughout the sample as aggressive, underhanded, unpredictable 
or irrational. This language bears the legacy of orientalist discourse, playing out most clearly in 
opinion pieces and letters to the editor. A debate-style opinion piece begins its critique of the ALP’s 
decision with the phrase: ‘India is a land of contrasts’ (Arnold 2011: 74). This common orientalist 
trope presents India as unknowable through Western rationality. This discourse relies on a 
‘common-sense’ notion that India has high income inequality. This is a persistent popular 
perception even though income inequality levels in India and Australia are extremely similar, and 
these levels are actually far higher in the United States (World Bank 2012). More deeply, however, 
this positioning of India seems out of place in the context of international uranium trade; it frames 
India as perplexing and conflicted from the outset. The article went on to define India as a risk in far 
more specific terms:  
It has a history of military clashes with its neighbours, alongside a history of political 
assassinations and large-scale sectarian violence. Bombings of hotels, railways 
stations and other facilities are attributed to local terrorists, militants from across the 
border or even India’s police and security services (Arnold 2011: 74). 
 
‘Clashes with neighbours’ can be read as a reference to India’s 1962 border war with China as well 
as more obvious tensions with Pakistan (a common argument marshalled against selling uranium to 
India in the coverage). India’s instability is emphasised as both internal and external, significantly 
17 
 
with its own police and security positioned as part of a broader culture of violence. Similarly, India 
emerges as ‘endemically corrupt’ in a letter to The Age that opines:  
[W]ho will make sure none of the enhanced uranium ends up in nuclear weapons or 
the hands of terrorist organisations – the poor guard who takes a few rupees to look 
the other way while the businessmen do their deals? (Fisher 2011: 16)  
 
This overblown discourse of threat constructs India as irrational and dangerous,14 inviting the reader 
to perceive India as unpredictable and therefore a risk. In a time of crisis, it is implied, they may 
well use their nuclear weapons against both Pakistan and China without concern for the 
consequences.  
 
This strand of discourse echoes across the sample in articles that quote ‘expert’ political and 
academic sources in support of the argument that Australia should not export uranium to a country 
that ‘has had three wars with its neighbours’ and is ‘developing rockets to send nuclear weapons 
into its neighbours’ (Cameron in Johnson 2011: 1).15 Here, the implication is that India and China 
have a history of conflict and are therefore likely to fight one another again. Cameron’s assertion 
was unpicked in a letter to the Canberra Times, which pointed out that India’s war with Pakistan in 
1971 ‘arguably also prevented a genocide’ (Gordon 2011: 22). The construction of Australia as 
rational, relies on this unsettling suggestion that India and China are not rational actors and are 
likely to engage in a war which would ultimately result in their own ‘mutually assured destruction’. 
This creates a clear contrast between ‘our’ rationality and ‘their’ irrational actions and motivations. 
Andy Butfoy (2011: 8) constructs India as fundamentally untrustworthy due to its less-than-perfect 
non-proliferation record. India’s nuclear program is presented as evidence of aggression and 
duplicity: India has ‘duped’ its suppliers of ‘civil nuclear technology’ and ‘gatecrashed its way into 
the nuclear weapons club’ (Butfoy 2011: 8; emphasis added). This metaphor implies India is 
impatient and aggressive, unwilling to accept established liberal international ‘norms’, and therefore 
outside Australia’s trustworthy circle of liberal democracies.  
                                                 
14 India’s security forces are widely regarded to be comfortably under the control of government (Cohen 2002). 




Alongside these constructions is the use of gendered language, which feminises and 
stereotypes India as an attractive, ‘seductive’ actor(ess). This orientalist language describes both 
India’s power and Australia’s desire to connect with her. Strikingly, ‘relationship’ metaphors are 
employed in a number of articles to describe the motivations behind and implications of Australia 
selling uranium to India. This language constructs international uranium sales as a competition 
between Australia and other states for access to India’s growing wealth; ‘chief among India’s 
suitors’, here, ‘is America’ (Fleming 2011: 61). The term ‘suitor’ presents a gendered construction 
of India as feminine, being pursued by masculine states who wish to use her resources; for example, 
visions of nuclear power plants as providing clean electricity to India’s poor are referred to as 
‘seductive’ (Arnold 2011: 74).16  
 
Greg Sheridan (2011: 12) uses this ‘relationship’ metaphor explicitly in an opinion piece in 
The Australian, ‘Gillard charms India with yellowcake’ (emphasis added). Sheridan (2011: 12) 
concludes: ‘Though we are very rich, India is a much bigger nation than we are. If we want to get 
its attention and build a serious relationship, we need to take the initiative.’ This constructs 
Australia as a small, unattractive nation (despite its wealth), needing to make a ‘gesture’ to show its 
affection for India. Here, India can pick only from certain appropriate ‘suitors’ (Australia, the US, 
Canada, France, etc); and although ‘we’ have valuable resources, India is an attractive ‘catch’ that 
will require Australia to ‘punch above its weight’ (a common theme of the Australia’s creative 
middle power discourse).17 Sheridan’s relationship metaphor relies on gendered language that treats 
international politics like speed dating, constructing India as an attractive, exotic woman encircled 
by powerful, rich, white men; with Australia struggling to gain her attention amongst the more 
powerful, masculine suitors. As Walker (2010) shows, Australia has long feminised Asia within its 
                                                 
16 On the feminisation of Asia, see Walker 2010.  
17 This is common colloquial terminology see, Beeson 2011.  
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identity discourse, which reflects a vision of itself as masculine. Australia remained as masculine in 
the international context despite being led by its first female prime minister.18 
 
It is worth noting, finally, that the question of nuclear deterrence is not raised in the sample, 
despite IR’s realists often suggesting that India-Pakistan relations are stabilised by nuclear weapons 
(Ganguly 2008). Constructions in the sample tend to idealise a rational and moral Australia, and the 
coverage mostly regards India and China with trepidation: as they may not act rationally and 
therefore cannot be ‘trusted’ to follow what are seen as our (neoliberal, democratic) norms. This 
constructs a moral, rational Australian Self against irrational ‘Asian’ Others, with the possibility of 
nuclear war a result of their characteristics and a justification for our behaviour. There is a split 
within the traditionalist narrative of Australian foreign policy in perceiving India as an irrational, 
dangerous actor and the perception, which emphasises India’s ‘Anglosphere’ characteristics as 
driving cooperation. Australia’s ‘realism’ is animated by the perception of irrationality in Others. 
The latter approach is likewise problematic as it relies on an overemphasis on a positive narrative of 
India’s colonial history as a justification for closer relations.  
 
Conclusion: Why the Media Matters to Australian foreign policy 
  
Media coverage of the sale of uranium to India reveals an Australia that is deeply anxious 
about its place in the world: fundamentally shaped by its history and identity, wondering if it can 
truly trust those it sees as ‘unlike itself’, grappling with the implications of the ‘rise’ of ‘Asian 
giants’ China and India, and unsure whether a discourse of rationality or morality should guide its 
foreign policy. This is reflected throughout the sample in news stories and their quoted sources, 
opinion pieces and academic commentaries. More deeply, letters to the editor reflect the same 
narrative choices used by politicians, commentators, academics and journalists, and their inclusion 
here demonstrates the value of an approach which moves beyond structured, hierarchical 
                                                 
18 On the gendered politics of the Gillard era, see Johnson, 2015 
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understandings of the role of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ discourses in identity formation. Although the 
authors of these newspaper pieces and letters to the editor are not in a position to make policy 
decisions, this analysis reveals that discourses around Australian morality and rationality are 
developed, and open to contest, by both policy elite and the general public. The discourses 
examined here played out in mainstream newspaper coverage, which localises (and at times 
sensationalises) issues, fills in gaps left by policymakers, influences the commentary that dominates 
public debate, and provides space for (often-problematic) expert and audience opinion and analysis 
that makes international politics relevant by describing the unfamiliar ‘in the terms of the familiar’. 
For Australian foreign policy, the consistent reliance on orientalist tropes and the stereotyping of 
Others in media and foreign policy discourse is troubling. It is both a symptom and a cause of 
Australia’s ambivalent relationship with Asia. The mainstream news media, and the complex media 
ecology in which they sit, should be seen as a crucial space in which Australian identity is formed 
and contested, where new ideas and narratives of Australian identity may emerge. It is one that 
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